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Abstract
Gibbsian statistical mechanics (GSM) is the most widely used version of sta-
tistical mechanics among working physicists. Yet a closer look at GSM reveals
that it is unclear what the theory actually says and how it bears on experimen-
tal practice. The root cause of the difficulties is the status of the Averaging
Principle, the proposition that what we observe in an experiment is the en-
semble average of a phase function. We review different stances toward this
principle, and eventually present a coherent interpretation of GSM that pro-
vides an account of the status and scope of the principle.
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1 Introduction
Gibbsian statistical mechanics (GSM) is a powerful theory because it offers a general
prescription of how to calculate an array of equilibrium properties, and its methods
are applied across a large range of different systems. For these reasons GSM is widely
used and considered by many to be the formalism of statistical mechanics.1 Yet a
closer look at GSM reveals that it is unclear what the theory says and how it bears
on experimental practice. The issue is that GSM is an ensemble theory and as such
it makes statements about the behaviour of ensembles rather than about individual
physical systems. A common way of bridging the gap between ensembles and systems
is to adopt an averaging principle: what we observe in an experiment on a system is
the ensemble average of a phase function representing a relevant physical quantity.
Although this principle is commonly used in applications, the status and scope of the
principle are unclear and different authors make conflicting pronouncements. But
until the status and scope of the averaging principle are settled, or some alterna-
tive method of bridging the gap between ensembles and individual systems has been
found, it is unclear what the content of GSM is. Hence our plea: can somebody
please say what GSM says?
We first introduce GSM, lay bare the problem of connecting the formalism of GSM to
the behaviour of individual physical systems, and document the lack of a consensus
on the matter in the physics literature (Section 2). We then point out that remaining
silent about the problem does not make the problem go away (Section 3), and that
the traditional answer in terms of time averages is not viable for a number of reasons
(Section 4). We proceed to introduce a position we call ‘bare probabilism’, the view
that the probability measures in GSM give universally true probabilities for events to
occur and that nothing else should be read into GSM. We discuss two versions of this
view, one based on ensembles and one based on the notion that the theory’s probabil-
ity measure ρ is the macro-state of a system, and point out that both of them leave
essential questions unanswered (Section 5). The answer to these questions comes
from the study of fluctuations. These can be integrated into probabilism in two dif-
ferent ways, leading to two equally acceptable positions we call ‘qualified probabilism’
and ‘fluctuation probabilism’ (Section 6). Probabilism endorses ρ-universalism, the
view that ρ gives the correct probabilities for all events at all times. We point out
that this assumption is not generally true and that probabilism only works if what
we call the ‘masking condition’ or the ‘f -independence condition’ hold. Under these
conditions, and if fluctuations turn out to be thermodynamic, the averaging principle
1The first chapter of Landau and Lifshitz’s ([1980]) classical introduction is entitled ‘the fun-
damental principles of statistical physics’ and is dedicated entirely to a discussion of the Gibbs
formalism; Isihara ([1971]) introduces the Gibbs formalism in a chapter called ‘principles of statis-
tical mechanics’. These are no exceptions.
3
is justified (Section 7). We finally draw some conclusions and point out that there
are justifications of the averaging principle that do not rely on probabilism (Section 8).
Two caveats are in place. First, throughout the paper we discuss GSM in the setting
of classical mechanics, and we assume that the dynamics is deterministic. We be-
lieve that many of the issues we discuss will recur when GSM is applied to classical
stochastic systems or to quantum systems,2 but space constraints prevent us from
discussing these systems here. Second, even though there are attempts to generalise
GSM to non-equilibrium situations, GSM is first and foremost an equilibrium theory.
We restrict attention to the equilibrium case and set non-equilibrium considerations
aside.
2 Systems and Ensembles
A system S is a part of the physical world: a gas in a container, a crystal on the
laboratory table, a liquid in jar. From a mathematical point of view a system has
the structure of a so-called measure-preserving dynamical system. In the current con-
text the difference between a physical system and its mathematical representation
is inessential, and we use the term ‘system’ to refer to either the physical object or
its mathematical representation.3 A system, then, is a quadruple (X,ΣX , φt, µ). X
is the system’s state space, which contains all states the system’s micro-constituents
could assume. For this reason the states in X are referred to as micro-states. In the
case of a gas consisting of n molecules, X has 6n dimensions: three dimensions for
the position of each particle and three dimensions for the corresponding momenta.
ΣX is a σ-algebra of subsets of X, and µ is a measure on ΣX . The evolution function
φt determines how the system’s micro-state changes over time. If at a certain time
t0 the system is in micro-state x0, then it will be in state φt(x0) at a later time t.
The path that φt(x0) traces through X as time evolves is the trajectory through x0,
and x0 is the initial condition. Throughout we assume that µX is invariant under φt,
meaning that the subsets of X can change their shape but not their measure as time
evolves.4
At the macro level the system is characterised by a set of macro-variables such as
volume, pressure, and magnetisation. From a mathematical point of view macro-
variables are functions f : X → R; i.e. functions that associate a real number with
2Classical stochastic systems are discussed in Werndl and Frigg ([2017b]).
3For a discussion of what it takes for mathematical object to represent a physical system see
Frigg and Nguyen ([2018]).
4A more extensive description of the elements of a system can be found in Werndl and Frigg
([2015]). For a general introduction to dynamical systems see Katok and Hasselblatt ([1993]).
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each point in X. If, for instance, f is the magnetisation of the system and the sys-
tem is in micro-state x, then f(x) is the magnetisation of the system when it is in
micro-state x.
Systems as defined so far do not come equipped with a notion of equilibrium; nor is
any such notion tacitly implied either by the definition of a system or by the defini-
tion of a macro-variable.
The key concept of GSM is that of an ensemble. Informally an ensemble is often
described as an infinite collection of systems of the same kind (and with the same
time evolution) that differ in their state.5 It is important that an ensemble is a collec-
tion of copies of the entire system S (as characterised above) and not a collection of
molecules. In fact, an ensemble is best thought of as a collection of ‘mental copies of
the one system under consideration’ (Schro¨dinger [1989], p. 3). Hence the members
of an ensemble do not interact with each other; an ensemble is not a physical object;
and ensembles have no spatiotemporal existence.
A natural question to ask about a collection of systems that differ in their instanta-
neous state is how these states are distributed. The distribution of states is formalised
with the aid of a probability measure ρ on X, which encodes, intuitively speaking,
what proportion of systems in the collection are in states that are located in a certain
subset of X. With ρ at hand, one would now want to ascend from the intuitive to the
precise and offer a formal definition of an ensemble. But at this point an ambiguity
becomes apparent. The issue is that talk of a ‘collection of systems’ allows for two
readings.
On a narrow reading, an ensemble is a collection of systems that are distributed in
a particular way. This can be formalised by associating the ensemble with a partic-
ular probability measure: the ensemble simply is the measure ρ. This squares with
locutions like ‘the microcanonical ensemble’ or ‘the canonical ensemble’, which seem
to associate ensembles with a particular distribution (more about these distributions
below). However, this reading has an important limitation. In the physics literature
one also often encounters talk of the state of an ensemble, and of the state of an
ensemble changing.6 But talk of the state of an ensemble is pointless if the ensemble
is defined by ρ: if the distribution changes, one ensemble goes out of existence and a
new ensemble is created. On the narrow reading, a change in ρ is not a change of an
ensemble’s state; it is an act of annihilation and recreation.
5This is Gibbs’ original characterisation ([1981], p. v, p. 5). See also Agarwal and Eisner ([1988],
p. 5), Hill ([1986], p. 3, [1987], p. 4), Kittel ([2004], pp. 7–8), and Schro¨dinger ([1989], p. 3).
6See, for instance, Tolman ([1979], p. 46).
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A broad reading accommodates the notion of a change of state. It interprets an en-
semble as a ‘bare’ collection of systems: a collection of systems that has no particular
distribution. The systems in the ensemble can then be distributed in different ways.
These ways can be described by different measures ρ, which are the ensemble’s states.
This suggest a definition of an ensemble as a pair (X,P ), where P is the class of all
probability measures over (X,ΣX). P is the ensemble’s state space: each measure
in P specifies a state of the ensemble; if the measure changes, the ensemble’s state
changes. The time evolution of the ensemble is described by changes in ρ. If changes
in ρ happen solely due the unperturbed evolution of the systems in the ensemble,
then the ensemble distribution at time t is given by ρt(x) = ρ0(φ−t(x)), where ρ0 is
the distribution at the initial time t0.
Nothing in what follows depends on which of the two definitions of an ensemble one
adopts, and our points can be made with either of the definitions. However, our
discussion is more easily framed in the broader reading, and hence we adopt that
reading from now on.
The ensemble average of a macro-variable f for an ensemble in state ρ is
〈f〉 =
∫
X
f(x)ρ(x, t)dx. (1)
In his discussion of ensembles Gibbs introduces what he calls the ‘condition of sta-
tistical equilibrium’ ([1981], p. 8). An ensemble is in statistical equilibrium iff (if and
only if) ρ is stationary.7 A distribution is stationary iff it does not change over time,
meaning that it is invariant under the dynamics: ρ0(x) = ρt(x) for all t. For obvious
reasons 〈f〉 is constant if the distribution is stationary.
There will usually be a large number of stationary distributions for a certain dy-
namics, and so the question arises which of these distributions should be chosen to
characterise a given situation. Gibbs discusses this issue at length and proposes the
so-called microcanonical distribution if the system is completely isolated from its en-
vironment, and the so-called canonical distribution if the system is in contact with
a heat bath of a certain temperature.8 The justification of these distributions as
7This view is adopted widely in the extant physics literature as well as in philosophical discussions
about GSM; see, for instance, Hill ([1987], p. 8), Myrvold ([2016], pp. 588–9), and Tolman ([1979], p.
63). A diverging account was put forward by van Lith ([1999]) who suggested replacing stationarity
with the requirement that the distribution be such that the phase average of a few selected phase
functions be constant. Our concerns are orthogonal to van Lith’s and none of the issues that we
discuss below change if van Lith’s definition is adopted.
8These distributions are discussed in any textbook on statistical mechanics. See for instance,
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the correct distributions for certain situations can proceed along different lines, and
a number of suggestions have been made.9 We pass over this matter here because
nothing in what follows depends on how the choice of a particular distribution is
justified. The crucial point to bear in mind is that statistical equilibrium pertains to
an ensemble and hence provides a notion of an ensemble-equilibrium.
The notion of an ensemble-equilibrium contrasts with that of a system-equilibrium.
As noted above, a system is part of the physical world. When is such a part in equi-
librium? Thermodynamics (TD) offers a clear answer to this question: a system is in
thermodynamic equilibrium ‘when none of its thermodynamic properties are changing
with time’ (Reiss [1996], p. 3).10 In other words, the idea is that we look at a full
set of thermodynamic variables and track their values over time; when the values do
not change any more, then the system has reached equilibrium. The values that the
system settles on when values do not change any more are the equilibrium values.
We are now faced with two different objects of study and two different notions of
equilibrium. On the one hand there are systems, which can be in thermodynamic
equilibrium. On the other hand there are ensembles, which can be in statistical equi-
librium. How do these points of view relate to one another? This question is of
paramount importance because statistical mechanics requires both. A physical sys-
tem is what one has experimental access to and what one ultimately aims to study.
At the same time it is the ensemble approach that provides the mathematical appa-
ratus to carry out calculations and generate predictions. But what do calculations
performed on an ensemble tell us about the properties of a system? Or for those
who prefer to think about the problem in terms of experiments: what do ensemble
calculations tell us about experimental results?
A common way to bridge the gap between ensembles and systems is to adopt what
we call the Averaging Principle (AP): when measuring the property f on a system
in system-equilibrium, the observed equilibrium value of the property is the ensem-
Lavis ([2015]).
9For surveys see Frigg and Werndl ([forthcoming]) and Myrvold ([2016]).
10Thermodynamic equilibrium is also discussed in Buchdahl ([1975], p. 2), Fermi ([2000], p. 4),
Guggenheim ([1967], p. 7), Gyftopoulos ([2005], p. 55), Honig ([1999], p. 3), Kubo ([1968], p. 2),
Pippard ([1966], pp. 5–6), and van Ness ([1969], p. 74). Being in thermodynamic equilibrium is an
intrinsic property of the system, which offers a notion of ‘internal equilibrium’ (Guggenheim [1967],
p. 7). It contrasts with ‘mutual equilibrium’ (ibid., 8), which is the relational property of being in
equilibrium with each other that two systems eventually reach after being put into thermal contact
with each other. Mutual equilibrium is often referred to as ‘thermal equilibrium’. It is the notion
that figures in the zeroth law of thermodynamics, which effectively says that thermal equilibrium is
an equivalence relation. In the current context, thermodynamic rather than thermal equilibrium is
the relevant concept.
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ble average 〈f〉 of an ensemble in ensemble-equilibrium.11 About two thirds of the
around thirty textbooks on statistical mechanics we consulted when researching this
paper offer explicit statements of AP, and those that do not explicitly state AP ap-
peal to it tacitly by basing their considerations on averages.12 The formulations of
the principle in textbooks also make it clear that AP concerns single measurements.
So AP should be read as saying that the outcome of a single measurement of property
f on a system in system-equilibrium is 〈f〉. The full content of AP is, however, left
underdetermined until a theory of measurement is supplied. As we will see below,
different schools of thought do this in different ways (associating measurement out-
comes either with time averages or instantaneous values), which results in different
versions of the principle.
AP lets us have the best of both worlds: one can use the formalism of ensembles
to calculate equilibrium properties of a system. The importance of this principle
in practical applications is beyond dispute: calculating averages is the backbone of
GSM and it is what delivers the results. However, pronouncements on the status of
the principle vary considerably, even among authors who state AP explicitly. Some
regard AP as the cornerstone of GSM. Chandler calls it ‘[t]he primary assumption of
statistical mechanics’ ([1987], p. 58), and Pathria and Beale regard it as the ‘the most
important result’ ([2011], p. 31). Others urge caution. Hill notes that no ‘completely
rigorous proof is available’ ([1987], p. 8), and Kittel says that ‘it has not been proved
in general’ ([2004], p. 8). Gibbs ([1981], p. 168) himself endorses the principle only
for certain situations, and Lawden ([2005], p. 60) emphasises restrictions. Yet others
remain silent about the question of status and scope (see, for instance, Baxter [1982],
p. 9).
So there are serious questions of rationalisation. What does it mean to perform a
measurement? Under what circumstances does AP apply? And how is the appli-
11AP only makes the conditional claim that if a physical quantity is associated with a phase
function f , then the outcome of a measurement of that quantity is 〈f〉. It remains silent about
temperature and entropy, for which there are no phase functions.
12Explicit statements are given by Agarwal and Eisner ([1988], p. 7), Baxter ([1982], p. 9),
Chandler ([1987], p. 58), Greiner ([1993], p. 219), Hill ([1986], p. 13, [1987], p. 9), Isihara ([1971],
pp. 23–5), Jancel ([1969], pp. xix–xxii), Jellito ([1989], pp. 198–205), Khinchin ([1949], pp. 44–7),
Kittel ([2004], p. 8), Landau and Lifshitz ([1980], p. 6), Lavis and Bell ([1999], p. 32), Pathria
and Beale ([2011], p. 31), and Ruelle ([1969], p. 3). The principle is stated with some reluctance
(which we discuss below) by Gibbs himself ([1981], p. 168), Lawden ([2005], pp. 60–1), and Tolman
([1979], pp. 62–70). The principle is implicit in Mackey ([2003], pp. 11–4), Sadovskii ([2012], pp.
5–7), and the discussion of the Gibbs formalism in Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest ([1959], pp. 47–51).
A tacit appeal to the principle can be witnessed in Feynman ([1972], Ch. 1), Huang ([1963], Chs.
7, 8), Lavis ([2015], Ch. 2), Reif ([1985], Ch. 2), Schro¨dinger ([1989], Chs. 2, 6), and Thompson
([1972], Ch. 3, [1988], Ch. 2).
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cation justified? As previously noted, AP occupies centre stage in GSM and it is
empirically successful in that it allows for the calculation of a vast array of equilib-
rium values that are then found to be in good agreement with experimental results.
But as long as the status of a core constituent of a theory is unclear, the content of
the theory itself is unclear.
3 Quietism
Mathematically minded books tend to eschew the question and simply accept the
association of thermodynamic values with ensemble averages as a proposition that
does not stand in need of further explanation. Thompson ([1972], p. 61, [1988], p.
30) simply equates work and pressure with ensemble averages without further com-
ment. Similar moves can be found in Baxter ([1982], p. 9) and Feynman ([1972], pp.
1–6). This ‘quietist’ approach is conceptually unsatisfactory because it sheds no light
on the relation between GSM and TD. One simply has to accept it as a primitive
assumption that the values of thermodynamic variables can be expressed in terms of
ensemble averages without an explanation of why this is so. While practitioners may
find it expedient to avoid the issue in this way, from a foundational point of view qui-
etism is a deeply unsatisfactory position because it leaves the relation between GSM
and thermodynamics (or indeed any macroscopic account of a system’s behaviour)
unexplained.
4 The Time Average Approach
The ‘standard’ textbook approach explains AP by equating phase averages with time
averages.13 The infinite time average of f is
f ∗(x0) = lim
τ→∞
1
τ
∫ t0+τ
t0
f(φt(x0))dt, (2)
where x0 is the initial state of the system at time t0. The argument runs as fol-
lows. As we have seen above, macro-variables are associated with functions f on
X. Carrying out a measurement of f takes time, and hence what the measurement
device registers is the time average of f over the duration of the measurement. Since
performing a measurement takes a long time compared to the time scale on which
typical molecular processes take place, the measured result is approximately equal
13This strategy can be found, for instance, in Chandler ([1987], pp. 57–9), Hill ([1986], pp. 4–6,
[1987], pp. 8–9), Isihara ([1971], pp. 24–30), Jancel ([1969], pp. xxii–xxiii), Khinchin ([1949], pp.
44–7), Kittel ([2004], pp. 7–8), and Pathria and Beale ([2011], 30–2).
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to the infinite time average of the measured function. A system is ergodic if for all
measurable functions the infinite time average is equal to the ensemble average for
almost all initial conditions.14 If one now assumes that the system is ergodic, one can
equate the time average and the ensemble average, which provides the sought-after
connection: GSM provides phase averages which, by ergodicity, are equal to infinite
time averages, and these are equal to the values obtained from measurements.
Implicit in this answer is the postulation that f ∗ is the equilibrium value of the
system. Although this is plausible given the other assumptions, there is a concep-
tual difference between equilibrium values and time averages and that the two are
equal has to be added as an additional postulate. So we arrive at the following
position. The observed value in a measurement of f on a system in equilibrium is
f ∗. The system is ergodic and therefore it is the case that f ∗ = 〈f〉 for almost all
initial conditions. One can safely neglect the ‘few’ initial conditions for which this
equality fails, and hence observed values are equal to ensemble averages, as AP has it.
This argument fails for a number of reasons. First, as Malament and Zabell ([1980],
pp. 342–3) and Sklar ([1973], p. 211, [1993], pp. 176–9) point out, from the fact
that measurements take some time it does not follow that what is actually measured
are time averages, and the association of measurement results with time averages is
unjustified. Even if one could somehow argue that measurement devices do output
time averages, equating these finite averages with infinite time averages is problem-
atic. Finite and infinite averages can assume very different values even if the duration
of the finite measurement is very long. This is a sticky point because the invocation
of infinite time averages is crucial: if one replaces infinite with finite time averages,
ergodicity no longer applies, and time averages and ensemble averages cannot be
equated. Furthermore, as Earman and Re´dei ([1996]) point out, the appeal to ergod-
icity is by no means unproblematic. Many systems are not ergodic and if a system
is not ergodic, then equating time averages and ensemble averages is completely
wrong.15
Furthermore, the assumption that f ∗ is the equilibrium value of f in system S is
introduced as primitive posit and it remains unclear why it should be adopted. And
this is not only a ‘philosopher’s worry’ that practitioners can safely set aside. The
function f could be such that it never assumes the time average as a value, and then
it would seem rather implausible to say that f = f ∗ is the system’s equilibrium con-
14See Arnold and Avez ([1968]) for a detailed discussion of ergodicity; an intuitive introduction
can be found in Frigg et al. ([2016]).
15One can mitigate the force of this objection somehow by requiring that the system be only
ε-ergodic rather than ‘fully’ ergodic (Vranas [1998]). While this resolves some problem, it does not
apply to all relevant cases. For a discussion see Frigg and Werndl ([2011]).
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dition. As simple example consider the number of students registered at a university
at a particular time. It may be the case that the time average of the student number
is 8345.458, but there was no moment in time when 8345.458 students were registered.
Finally, this account makes a mystery of how we observe change. It is a simple fact
that we do observe how systems approach equilibrium, and in doing so we observe
macro-variables change their values. If it was true that what we observe are infinite
time averages, then no change would ever be observed because these averages are by
definition constant.
For these reasons the time average approach, at least in its current instantiation,
offers no satisfactory justification of AP.
5 Bare Probabilism
An alternative approach urges a concentration on the theory’s probabilistic formal-
ism. The core of GSM is the normalised measure ρ, and for this reason ρ has to be the
centrepiece of any acceptable interpretation of GSM. We call this approach probabil-
ism. As we will see, probabilism comes in a number of different variants, which differ
in what events they recognise and in how much additional theoretical machinery they
accept. What all variants have in common is a postulate we call ρ-universalism, the
assertion that ρ is universally valid in that it gives the correct probabilities for all
events (recognised by the theory) to occur at all times. Throughout this section and
the next we work under the assumption that ρ-universalism is true. The position will
be scrutinised in Section 7, where we point out that ρ-universalism is correct only
under certain conditions.
The first variant of probabilism takes the formalism of GSM at face value and inter-
prets ρ as a probability measure over the system’s phase space X. This amounts to
saying that if the ensemble is in equilibrium, then for all regions R in X and for all
times t the probability of the system’s micro-state being in R at t is:
p(R) =
∫
R
ρ(x)dx. (3)
To connect these probabilistic outcomes to observables one now adopts the notion of
an instantaneous measurement, which sees a measurement as happening at a partic-
ular instant of time. Penrose describes a measurement of that kind as ‘an instanta-
neous act, like taking a snapshot’ ([2005], pp. 17–8). This idea can be made precise
11
as follows: if a measurement is performed on a system S at time t and the system’s
microstate at time t is x, then the measurement outcome will be f(x). An obvious
consequence of this definition is that measurements at different times can have dif-
ferent outcomes, and the values of macro-variables can change over time.
AP has not entered the scene so far, and the handling of AP is what separates what
we call bare probabilism from other forms of probabilism. Following Wallace one
can insist that the quantitative content of statistical mechanics is exhausted by the
statistics of observables (their expectation values, variances, etc.) and that ‘statistical
mechanics should not be thought of wholly or even primarily as itself a foundational
project for thermodynamics’ ([2015], p. 285). On such a view GSM really is just a
study of the statistical properties of ρ(x) with nothing else added. Hence, according
to bare probabilism AP is superfluous and should be abandoned. In fact, any at-
tempt to build a principle relating its formalism to thermodynamic equilibrium into
GSM should be renounced. Instead GSM should be regarded as purely probabilistic
theory. GSM characterises a system’s statistical equilibrium and specifies how likely
a system will be found in certain micro-states when an instantaneous measurement
is performed. That is all that there is to GSM. Any attempt to read more into GSM,
in particular any attempt to read a notion of thermodynamic equilibrium into it, is
misguided and should be resisted.16
As we have seen above, a probability density is in statistical equilibrium iff it is sta-
tionary, and on the current approach this is all that there is to say on the subject
matter of equilibrium in GSM. The consequences of this brand of austerity are severe.
The fact that thermodynamic equilibrium and statistical equilibrium are both equi-
libria does not mean that they are somehow similar, or that statistical equilibrium
can serve as a stand-in for thermodynamic equilibrium when the latter is excised. In
fact, statistical and thermodynamic equilibrium are not only conceptually different,
the two notions also do not have the same extension. An ensemble in statistical equi-
librium not only contains systems in thermodynamic equilibrium; it can also contain
any number of systems that are not in thermodynamic equilibrium.17 So from the
fact that an ensemble is in statistical equilibrium one cannot infer that a system
16We have not been able to find an explicit statement of bare probabilism based on Equation (3)
in print. However, it has been suggested to us as a natural interpretation of GSM on a number of
occasions, and it sets the stage for McCoy’s version of bare probabilism to which we turn shortly.
17This point has been made by Uffink who emphasises that ‘any given system can be regarded as
belonging to an infinity of different ensembles’ and that it therefore ‘makes no sense to say whether
an individual system is in statistical equilibrium or not’ ([2007], p. 1005). Callender ([1999], p. 367)
made the point in terms of entropy: the Gibbs entropy can assume its equilibrium value and yet a
system in the ensemble can be vastly out of equilibrium. For this reason the Gibbs entropy does not
reflect a system’s behaviour, and the entropy of a system cannot be reduced to the Gibbs entropy.
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randomly drawn from that ensemble is in thermodynamic equilibrium. Conversely,
if a given system is in thermodynamic equilibrium, one cannot infer that this system
belongs to an ensemble in statistical equilibrium. Ensemble-equilibrium and system-
equilibrium remain disconnected and unmediated.
In a recent paper McCoy ([2018]) argues that a fundamental mistake has been made
early on. The mistake is to associate GSM’s probability distributions with ensem-
bles, and thereby setting up a dichotomy between ensembles and systems that one
then has to deal with through various interpretative moves. His radical remedy is
to abandon ensembles altogether and regard the probability measure ρ as the state
of a system. McCoy urges that ‘one must take seriously the idea that probability
measures represent the complete physical states of individual statistical mechanical
systems’ (ibid. 9), and therefore calls ρ a ‘macrostate’ (ibid. 10). States in a statisti-
cal theory differ fundamentally from states in a deterministic theory. The state of a
classical mechanical system is specified by a set of specific values of the position and
momentum variables. In a statistical theory no such values can be given because the
state of the system is the probability distribution. The state of an GSM system spec-
ifies the ‘potentialities’ of the system’s observables (ibid. 6) and not its categorical
properties: the state says what properties could be observed and how likely certain
outcomes are. At any given time, to specify ρ is to say everything that there is to
be said about the system’s state at that time, and the time evolution of the system
is given by specifying how ρ evolves over time. We refer to this as the probabilistic
states interpretation of GSM.
The next step is to re-interpret the theory’s formalism so that it provides probabil-
ities for observables rather than micro-states. McCoy points out that this is easily
done (ibid. 13). Let f be the observable of interest, and let us denote a particular
value of f by F . Then p(F ) is given by Equation (3) with R = {x ∈ X : f(x) = F}.
The distribution p(F ) can now be regarded as a probability distribution for stochas-
tically evolving observables. We now see the new picture before us: the system has
macro-states ρ and observables that evolve stochastically according to probabilities
given by the system’s macro-state. On this account there are neither ensembles nor
micro-states, and so there is no bridge to gap between systems and ensembles.
One might object that p(F ) can be defined only with underlying micro-states and
so there is no genuine stochastic dynamics for observables. McCoy anticipates this
objection and submits that ‘one has to give up on the idea that statistical mechanical
systems possess deterministically evolving classical microstates’ (ibid. 11). Taken at
face value this amounts to nothing less than a rejection of atomism. McCoy is aware
of the radical nature of his proposal and spends some time nuancing it. It is, however,
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not entirely clear what position he ends up with. On the one hand he responds ‘[m]y
goodness, of course not!’ to the charge that he repudiate the atomic hypothesis (ibid.
12); on the other hand he submits that ‘people grossly overestimate the import of the
alleged body of evidence for discrete, microscopic entities’, which are a metaphysical
posit ‘for which empirical evidence can hardly be decisive’ (ibid. 12).18 Eventually
the position seems to be that atomism is rejected in the context of classical mechanics
and that ‘the atomic hypothesis ultimately requires a quantum interpretation’ (ibid.
12).
There are serious questions about whether the rejection of the atomic hypothesis is
a price worth paying (even if restricted to classical mechanics), and about whether
a rejection of micro-states is as readily accommodated in quantum theory as McCoy
seems to suggest. Be this as it may, our concern at this point is more basic: the
problem of the relation between the two kinds of equilibrium has morphed but not
disappeared. If one regards ρ as the macro-state of a system, statistical equilibrium
pertains to systems (and not ensembles). But recasting statistical equilibrium as a
system-equilibrium does not make it equivalent to thermodynamic equilibrium. The
notions are as different as before. We have simply swapped the problem of bridging
the gap between ensemble-equilibrium (defined as statistical equilibrium) and system-
equilibrium (defined as thermodynamic equilibrium) for the problem of relating two
different notions of system-equilibrium to one another.
At this point one might ask why such a bridge is needed at all. McCoy emphasises
that ‘probability measures only represent the physical states of individual statistical
mechanical systems qua statistical mechanical systems’ (ibid. 3, original emphasis).
So why not simply say that there are two different perspectives on the same system
— statistical and thermodynamical — which do not need any mediation? Qua sta-
tistical mechanical system the state of a gas is ρ and it is in statistical equilibrium iff
ρ is stationary; qua thermodynamic system the state of the gas is given by the values
of its macro-variables and it is in equilibrium if none of these variables change over
time; and that is all that there is to be said about the matter.
This irenic perspectivalism is unconvincing, at least in the context of statistical me-
chanics and thermodynamics. Since McCoy renounces reductionism he may not be
moved by the fact that irenic perspectivalism undercuts reduction, even though for
many this would be a conclusive reason to abandon the position. But even those
who refuse to enlist in the reductionist cause are not free to simply retreat to the
18A rejection of atomism not only raises general questions, it also precludes us, as McCoy notes,
from ‘completing the project of the theory’s founders, namely, of reducing thermodynamics to the
mechanical motion of atoms and molecules’ (ibid. 5).
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view that different perspectives need no mediation. Cartwright, herself a critic of
reductionism, explains that there is a consistency problem ([1979]). Her main case
study is Maxwell’s derivation of a gas’ viscosity from its mechanical properties (a
case close to our current concerns!), but she illustrates the main point with the in-
tuitive example of Eddington’s two tables. Qua macro-object the table is a piece of
wood that is subject to the engineering laws concerning elasticity, stress, etc. Qua
micro-mechanical-object the table is a conglomerate of atoms and molecules moving
under the laws of fundamental mechanics. Cartwright then urges: ‘Some guarantee
of consistency is required. What is to prevent macroscopic laws from moving the
table one yard to the left, while all of its molecular components, following the laws of
microphysics, move 30 millimeters to the right?’ (ibid. p. 85) Reductionism offers an
elegant answer to the consistency problem: if one theory reduces to another theory
their predictions are consistent. Those who renounce reductionist commitments are
still left with the consistency problem. Irenic perspectivalism must give an account
of the consistency of perspectives, and this involves giving some account of the rela-
tion between statistical and thermodynamic equilibrium, even if it is not the kind of
full-fledged reduction that the theory’s founders had in mind.
Scientific practice poses a further challenge for irenic perspectivalism. In practice,
GSM and thermodynamics often work in tandem. Calculating phase averages and
relating them to equilibrium thermodynamical quantities is the bread and butter of
a physicist working with GSM.19 When studying the microcanonical ensemble, the
thermodynamic entropy of a system is associated with ln(ω) and the temperature
with (dω/dE)−1, where ω is the integral of ρ over a thin sheet around the energy hy-
persurface of the system. When working with the canonical ensemble it is standard
practice to calculate the Helmholtz free energy F as function of ρ: F = −kT logZ,
where Z is the partition function, which is essentially the normalisation factor of ρ.
These quantities are then inserted into the equations of thermodynamics and used for
calculations. In many cases even the thermodynamic equations of state are derived
from GSM. This practice must appear mysterious from a point of view that sees GSM
as completely disconnected from thermodynamics.
Stated without further qualifications, bare probabilism is too weak an interpretation
of GSM. A promising way to qualify the position is to study fluctuations. We intro-
duce fluctuations in the next section and then ask what their status is vis-a`-vis bare
probabilism.
19These calculations are standard and can be found in every textbook on the subject matter; see,
for instance, Hill ([1987], Ch. 3), Huang ([1963], Ch. 5) and Mackey ([2003], Ch. 2).
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6 Fluctuations
A way to answer the questions left open by bare probabilism is to study fluctuations.
Since measurement is assumed to be instantaneous, the system’s instantaneous state
x(t) is allowed to fluctuate away from 〈f〉. One can now ask how far from 〈f〉 the
system is. The difference between 〈f〉 and the instantaneous value of f at time t is
a fluctuation:
∆(t) = f(x(t))− 〈f〉. (4)
We call |∆(t)| the magnitude of the fluctuation.
Recall that ρ-universalism is the position that ρ provides the correct probabilities for
a system’s state to be in region R at time t for all R in X and for all t. Under that
assumption, Equation (3) can be used to calculate the probability of fluctuations of a
certain size.20 One finds that at any given time t the probability that the magnitude
of ∆(t) lies in the interval δ := [δ1, δ2], where δ1 and δ2 are real numbers such that
0 ≤ δ1 ≤ δ2, is:
p(δ) =
∫
D
ρ(x)dx, (5)
where D = {x ∈ X | δ1 ≤ |∆(t)| ≤ δ2}. This equation informs us about the proba-
bility that the system exhibits fluctuations of a certain magnitude at a certain time
t (under the assumption of ρ-universalism).
The leading idea now is to use the probabilities of fluctuations to characterise a sys-
tem’s macroscopic behaviour. As we have seen in Section 2, a system is in thermody-
namic equilibrium iff all change has come to a halt and the system’s macro-variables
assume constant values. By definition, these constant values are the thermodynamic
equilibrium values. Expressing this condition in terms of fluctuations yields that a
system is in thermodynamic equilibrium iff there are no fluctuations at all. In this
case 〈f〉 is the thermodynamic equilibrium value, and AP is true. However, statistical
mechanical systems do not meet this condition and so requiring the complete absence
of fluctuations is a dead end.21 Fluctuations are inevitable and a criterion that has
any chance of being met can only require that fluctuations are somehow unlikely.
20We use the standard version of probabilism and assume that ρ provides probabilities for the
system to be in certain sets of micro-states. This is choice of convenience; all points that follow
could equally be made in McCoy’s probabilistic state interpretation.
21The source of the problem is the fact that measure-preserving dynamical systems exhibit
Poincare´ recurrence and time-reversal invariance (Callender [2001]).
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A plausible candidate for such a condition is the requirement that small fluctuations
are likely while medium size and large fluctuations are unlikely. In formal terms, this
amounts to requiring that p(δ) is noticeably different from zero only for intervals that
lie close to zero and becomes vanishingly small for intervals far away from zero. A sys-
tem that exhibits this pattern approximately mimics thermodynamic behaviour, so
we refer to fluctuations that have these characteristics as thermodynamic fluctuations.
In fact, fluctuations being thermodynamic furnishes an approximate justification of
AP because the value of f for a system in equilibrium is approximately constant
and close to 〈f〉. Following Callander’s ([2001]) sage advice of not taking thermody-
namics too seriously, one can accept an approximate justification of AP as sufficient.
In this vein Hill submits that the validity of the identification of observable values
with ensemble averages is legitimate only when the fluctuations of f away from 〈f〉
are small ([1987], pp. 9–10), and Schro¨dinger declares ([1989], p. 35) that ‘[m]ean
value, most probable value, any values that occur with non-vanishing probability —
all become the same thing’.
It cannot be taken for granted that fluctuations are thermodynamic. Whether the
fluctuations in a given situation exhibit this pattern depends both on the system’s
dynamics and the macro-variables. While the fluctuations in some applications of
GSM turn out to be thermodynamic as expected, there are systems in which large
fluctuations turn out to be more likely than small fluctuations. Fluctuations in the
Kac-ring with the standard macro-state structure of the number of black and white
balls as discussed by Lavis ([2008]) are not thermodynamic. In our ([2017a]) we also
discuss two models in which fluctuations are not thermodynamic. The first is the
baker’s gas with a macro-variable V that takes integer values on cells of the standard
Boltzmannian partition; the second is the finite Ising model for certain termperature
values with the internal energy as a macro-variable. And in our ([unpublished]) we
show that the same result also occurs in the six-vertex model for certain temperature
values. That fluctuations are thermodynamic has to be ascertained on case-by-case
basis.
What is the status of AP vis-a`-vis bare probabilism? There are two options. As we
have seen above, bare probabilism insists that the quantitative content of statistical
mechanics is exhausted by the statistics of observables and that nothing else should
be added to it. This means that AP has no place in the theory and has to be located
somewhere else. The question is where. A plausible answer is to interpret AP as a
bridge law that is invoked when GSM is connected to TD. Bridge laws relate two
different theories to each other by establishing a relation between the terms of the
theories, typically with the aim of reducing one theory to the other.22 A classical
22For a discussion of reductionism and bridge laws see Dizadji-Bahmani et al. ([2010]).
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example of a bridge law is the law in the kinetic theory of gases which says that
temperature is proportional to the mean kinetic energy of the molecules, thereby
establishing a link between a mechanical concept (kinetic energy) and a thermody-
namic quantity (temperature). AP can be thought of as a bridge law of that kind.
While not being part of GSM proper, it then nevertheless establishes a link between
concepts in GSM and thermodynamics.
This is a workable position, but it is important to get clear on the commitments that
this implies. Locating AP outside GSM might suggest that it is a ‘voluntary addition’
that can be invoked when it is convenient, but ignored otherwise. Those who reject
an understanding of SM as a foundational project for thermodynamics would then be
free to ignore AP altogether. Unfortunately there is rather less freedom of choice. As
noted previously, it is common practice in applications to calculate a certain quantity
using the averaging methods of GSM and then plug it into thermodynamic equations.
For this to be legitimate, the requisite bridge law, namely AP, has to hold. So bare
probabilism must ensure that AP holds whenever GSM is used in tandem with TD.
Adding this proviso to bare probabilism gives qualified probabilism.
An alternative is to take statements in textbooks at face value and regard AP, in
Chandler’s words, as a primary assumption of statistical mechanics (see Section 2).
On such an interpretation AP is an integral part of GSM. We call this position
fluctuation probabilism. Fluctuation probabilism has to restrict dynamical laws and
observables that are allowable in GSM to those that produce thermodynamic fluc-
tuations. Restrictions of this kind are common: fields in electrodynamics must be
twice differentiable and forces in Newtonian mechanics must be Lipschitz continuous
for unique solutions to exist. However, as we will see later, it is less than clear what
conditions a system must satisfy for fluctuations to be thermodynamic and so making
this condition part of GSM introduces an certain degree of indeterminacy about the
theory’s content.
However, at the end of the day the choice between fluctuation probabilism and qual-
ified probabilism is an aesthetic matter. Both accounts have to come to terms with
fluctuations; they differ only in where they locate this problem. The main challenge
for both approaches is that they are based on ρ-universalism. In the next section we
show that ρ-universalism is false and that ρ gives correct probabilities for events to
occur at all times only if the system satisfies certain conditions.
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7 Scrutinising ρ-Universalism
All versions of probabilism presuppose ρ-universalism. Unfortunately, that doctrine
is not true in general and ρ can be used to calculate probabilities of events only
under certain circumstances (that is, Equations (3) and (5) have restricted validity).
The nature of these restrictions depends on how fluctuations are interpreted. In this
section we discuss two interpretations and spell out their implications.
On the first interpretation we consider the fluctuations that arise in the same system
when we observe its behaviour over time. This amounts to tracking a system over an
extended period of time (usually one considers the limit t → ∞) when the system
starts in a particular initial condition x0 at time t = 0 and its state evolves under φt.
The system’s instantaneous state at any time t then is x(t) = φt(x0). ρ-universalism
then asserts that for all R ⊂ X and all times t, Equation (3) gives the long-run
fraction of time that x(t) is in R as time goes to infinity and Equation (5) gives the
correct probability for fluctuations of certain magnitude to occur.
Unfortunately this is not the case. The problem is one that has been described by
Lawden ([2005], pp. 60–1) and Sklar ([1993], pp. 193–4). The dynamics of the
system can have conserved quantities. In that case the state space X decomposes
into invariant subsets, i.e. sets that are mapped onto themselves under the dynamics
of the system. A trajectory then remains confined to the subset in which its initial
condition lies and it never wanders off into other invariant subsets. This, however,
invalidates Equation (3), and with it Equation (5). To see how this happens assume
that X decomposes into two invariant subsets X1 and X2, and that ρ(X1) 6= 0 and
ρ(X2) 6= 0.23 Assume that the initial condition x0 of the system whose behaviour
we are tracing over time lies in X1. Because X1 is an invariant set, the system will
then never leave X1 and the probability of the system’s state ever being in X2 is
zero. Yet ρ assigns a non-zero probability to the system being in X2. So ρ makes
wrong predictions. As a result also the predictions for fluctuations can be wrong.
The function f may be such that it assumes certain values only in X2 and hence
fluctuations away from the mean of a certain magnitude only occur when the state of
the system is in X2. Equation (5) assigns a non-zero probability to such fluctuations
and yet the system never exhibits them.24
23The argument generalises trivially to any number of subsets. If the distribution ρ vanishes on
the invariant subsets, a similar argument can be made by choosing X1 (and X2) to be a collection
of invariant subsets with ρ(X1) 6= 0 (and ρ(X2) 6= 0).
24A referee suggested that this problem has an ‘easy and obvious remedy’, namely to ‘restrict the
probability distribution to the relevant invariant subset that describes the system with a particular
value of the conserved quantity’. Such restrictions would lead to distributions that are very different
from the ones usually considered in GSM and, as far as we can tell, such restrictions are not carried
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One way of avoiding these difficulties is to require that the system’s dynamics is such
that it can access all parts of X. In deterministic systems this is tantamount to
requiring that the system is ergodic.25 Some systems are of this kind: for all we know
the hard ball gas is ergodic. But other systems violate these conditions. The Kac ring
is a case in point. The uniform distribution on its state space is a Gibbsian equilib-
rium, and yet its state space has an ergodic decomposition, meaning that it consists
of a number of invariant subsets (Lavis [2005]). This is the situation we described
in the previous paragraph, and all the problems we mentioned arise in the Kac ring.
Another example where the same problem arises is a gas of non-interacting particles
in a multi-mushroom-box (Werndl and Frigg [forthcoming]). Furthermore, although
rigorous proofs are currently out of reach, it is generally expected that many fluids
and solids will not be ergodic, which, again, leads to the same difficulties (Uffink
[2007], p. 1017).
A possible response is that requiring ergodicity is asking for too much. All that is
needed is that if a system is ‘trapped’ in a certain part of state space, this does not
influence the probabilities of fluctuations. This happens just in case the proportion
of states for which f assumes a particular value is the same in each invariant subset.
In this case the p(δ) are the correct probabilities even if the system cannot access
the full state space. In other words, what is needed is not full ergodicity but the
weaker condition that the invariant sets of the dynamics (if any) and the function
f are attuned so as to ‘mask’ the fact that the system is trapped in certain invari-
ant sets. We call this the masking condition. Under what circumstances does the
masking condition hold? As far as we can see, there are no general criteria to decide
whether a system has this property. In fact, whether a trapping will be masked in
this way depends both on the time evolution φt and the macro-variable f , and one
will have to look at each f − φt pair to come to a verdict. A positive result can in
no way be taken for granted. If a system is not ergodic, there will always be many
macro-variables for which the masking condition fails.
The root of the difficulties we encountered so far (and which led to the formula-
tion of the masking condition) was the adoption of an interpretation of ∆(t) as the
fluctuation one observes on a single system when one traces the system’s state over
out in the practice of GSM. One reason for this is that the invariant subsets are usually not known,
which makes it impossible to specify a suitably restricted probability distribution. Furthermore,
invariant sets can be of measure zero, and then the restriction procedure provides no meaningful
results.
25For Markov processes (the kind of stochastic dynamics that is usually assumed in the context
of stochastic GSM) it amounts to requiring that the Markov process is irreducible. The six-vertex
model, for instance, is an irreducible Markov process.
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time. In the light of these difficulties one might deem this an unsuitable choice and
suggest that an alternative notion of fluctuation should be used. This alternative
interpretation emerges from Gibbs’ original description of an ensemble:
‘We may imagine a great number of systems of the same nature [...] And
here we may set the problem, not to follow a particular system through its
succession of configurations, but to determine how the whole number of
systems will be distributed among the various conceivable configurations
and velocities at any required time [...]’ (Gibbs [1981], p. v)
This suggests thinking of an ensemble like an urn of balls. An ensemble is a large
collection of (imaginary) systems and making an observation amounts to drawing
one system out of the ensemble. The distribution ρ then specifies the probability for
drawing a system whose state x lies in a certain part of the state space in much the
same way in which the fraction of red balls in the urn specifies the probability of
drawing a red ball. If the drawn system is in state x, the observed value of f is f(x),
and hence ρ also specifies the probabilities for certain values of f .
Gibbs relied on this idea when he observed that ‘[w]hat we know about a body can
generally be described most accurately and most simply by saying that it is one taken
at random from a great number (ensemble) of bodies which are completely described’
([1981], p. 163). This way of thinking about ensembles is widespread in the physics
literature. Hill says that ‘if a system is chosen at random from the ensemble at time
t, the probability of finding the phase point representative of its dynamical state
in dp dq about the point p, q is f dp dq’ ([1987], pp. 4–5), where f stands for the
Gibbsian ρ. Tolman describes the density ρ as giving the probability that ‘the phase
point for a system chosen at random from the ensemble would be found at time t to
have the specified values of the q’s and p’s’ ([1979], p. 47). Lawden states that ‘the
frequency with which a particular state is found in the ensemble is proportional to
its associated probability [i.e. ρ]’ ([2005], pp. 56–57). Agarwal and Eisner ([1988],
p. 7), Isihara ([1971], p. 21), Jellito ([1989], pp. 192–3), Penrose ([2005], pp. 97–8),
Reif ([1985], pp. 47–55), Schro¨dinger ([1989], p. 9), and Thompson ([1972], p. 56)
make statements to the same effect.
If one understands ρ as the probability of finding a system randomly drawn from the
ensemble in state x, Equation (3) is true by definition. One can then interpret the
f(x(t)) in the definition of ∆(t) as the result one gets when drawing a system from
the ensemble at random at time t (rather than as the observation of f on the same
system at different times). Under this interpretation ∆(t) is the statistical fluctuation
one finds in consecutive random draws. Since consecutive draws are by assumption
independent from one another, they do not depend on initial conditions. Hence the
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problem with invariant sets vanishes and Equation (5) is true under all circumstances.
This is an elegant move, but it raises a serious question. In laboratory experiments we
observe the same system at consecutive times rather than drawing different systems
out of an urn at random. This difference is significant because successive observations
on the same system are generally not independent in the way in which draws from an
urn are, and so it remains unclear what we can infer about laboratory experiments
from GSM under an ‘urn interpretation’.
One could respond to this worry by emphasising the qualification that observations
on the same system are generally not independent and argue that the systems of
interest in GSM fall into a special class of system for which independence holds.
The systems to which GSM applies, so the argument goes, are such that they effec-
tively re-randomise between measurements. Kittel discusses this issue and expresses
confidence that this happens in the sort of systems we are interested in:
‘the complex systems with which we are dealing appear to randomize
themselves between observations, provided only that the observations fol-
low each other by a time interval longer than a certain characteristic time
called the relaxation time. The relaxation time describes approximately
the time required for a fluctuation (spontaneous or arranged) in he prop-
erties of a system to damp out.’ (Kittel [2004], p. 7)
How can one characterise systems that have this property? The randomization that
is needed to get the position off the ground is of the following kind. Let A and B
be two arbitrary subsets of X. We write ‘At’ to indicate that the state of the sys-
tem that was drawn out of the urn at time t was in A, and likewise for ‘Bt’. The
independence condition needed for the urn interpretation to be correct then is this:
there exists a timespan τ (the relaxation time) so that for all A,B ⊆ X we have
p(Bt2|At1) = p(Bt2) provided t2 − t1 ≥ τ . That is, draws at later times have to
be probabilistically independent of draws at earlier times provided that the distance
between them is more than the relaxation time (which is presumed to be relatively
short).
This condition can be true only if the system is mixing, and even then the ran-
domization can be achieved only in the infinite limit and never over finite times.26
Moreover, mixing implies ergodicity and, as we have already seen, many systems in
statistical mechanics are not ergodic. A fortiori they are not mixing and therefore
do not randomize in the required manner. On might reply that we have required too
26See Berkovitz et al. ([2006]) and Werndl ([2009]).
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much by stipulating that p(Bt2|At1) = p(Bt2) has to hold for all subsets A and B of
X. One can prove that mixing is equivalent to the condition that for all functions
f ∈ L2(X) (where L2(X) is the space of square integrable functions on X) the se-
quence of
∫
X
f(φt(x))dµ converges to
∫
X
f(x)dµ as t tends towards infinity (Katok
and Hasselblatt [1993], p. 152). This shows that requiring that the system is mixing
is tantamount to requiring that independence holds with respect to all functions f .
But this may well be too strong. What is needed to make GSM work is only the
weaker assumption that independence holds with respect to certain selected functions
that are deemed relevant in a given context. Let f be a function on X. We then say
that a system is f -independent iff
∫
X
f(φt(x))dµ converges to
∫
X
f(x)dµ as t tends
towards infinity. The relevant concept then is f -independence rather than mixing.
Furthermore, one might argue that it is unnecessary to require that complete inde-
pendence is reached; all that is needed is that correlations relax below a level where
they become negligible. So it suffices to require that systems are approximately f -
independent for certain selected variables f .
Restricting the application of GSM to systems that are approximately f -independent
for a few selected variables is a successful move as far as it goes, but how far is this?
The problem is that reaching approximate independence in finite time is a relational
property that a macro-variable f possesses with respect to a particular time evolution
φt, and whether or not independence holds depends on both f and φt. On this ap-
proach one would have to check every f−φt pair before being licensed to apply GSM.
A radical way around this problem is to try to vary the setup and endeavour to
produce an ensemble empirically, for instance by destroying the system after every
measurement and recreate it in a new state (or, less dramatically, by interrupting its
time evolution and resetting its state). In this way one could, at least in principle,
produce a large number of independent systems that, taken together, approximate a
Gibbsian ensemble.
There are doubts that this will work.27 The systems produced in this way would
approximate the Gibbsian ensemble only if the process of ensemble preparation was
such that the systems ended up being produced according to the measure of the en-
semble. As Leeds ([1989], pp. 329–33) and Werndl ([2013], pp. 473–6) point out,
there is no reason to believe that the repeated preparation of a system in a certain
macro-condition will be such that the collection of all systems satisfies the relevant
Gibbsian distribution (e.g. the microcanonical distribution). In fact, depending on
the details of the process (who prepares the system and how) different distributions
27Furthermore, this project is of questionable legitimacy because in doing so one gives up the aim
of describing the evolution of single systems, which is important in statistical mechanics.
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could be obtained. The best one can hope for is that the resulting distribution is
absolutely continuous with ρ (i.e. it agrees with ρ on all sets of measure zero), but
this allows for empirical outcomes that diverge significantly from ρ.
There is a temptation to reply that this is an artefact of the state preparation and
that the time evolution of the system irons out the discrepancies between the distri-
bution resulting from the state preparation and the ensemble distribution. So rather
than saying that one observes a certain distribution ρ when repeatedly preparing
a system, one should be committed to the claim that one finds ρ when repeatedly
preparing a system and letting it run for a fixed time t (which is long enough for
the system to ‘settle down’). Unfortunately, this does not solve the problem either,
at least not in general. For it to be the case that all initial distributions28 converge
to the ensemble distribution, the dynamics has to be mixing (Werndl [2009]), which
gets us back to all the difficulties with mixing that we have already discussed.
In sum, the Gibbsian ρ can be used to calculate correct fluctuation probabilities
only if the time evolution φt and the macro-variable f work in tandem to guarantee
that the masking condition is satisfied or that f -independence holds at least approx-
imately. If one of those conditions holds, then the fluctuation probabilities as given
in Equation (5) truthfully reflect a system’s dynamics and can be used to assess its
equilibrium behaviour.
Unfortunately, both conditions are strong and cannot be taken for granted. And the
problem is not one that can be brushed aside as ‘irrelevant for all practical purposes’.
The possibility of these conditions not holding is not merely a remote mathematical
possibility that is inconsequential for applications; there are examples where these
conditions do fail. An example where the masking condition fails is the Kac ring.
Lavis ([2008], p. 686) shows that there are solutions which stay only 46.58% of their
time in a certain region X1 of the state space (the Boltzmannian equilibrium region)
where Equation (3) would predict that it should stay in that region 99.999% percent
of the time. If one now chooses an f so that it assumes one value in X1 and another
value in the rest of the phase space, then the masking condition is violated. The
condition also fails in a gas of non-interacting particles in a multi-mushroom box
with a macro-variable indicating whether the solution moves back and forth between
the first and second mushroom or between the second and third mushroom (Werndl
and Frigg [forthcoming]). These systems are not ergodic, and so one would expect
such failures. Since other systems are likely to be in the same category, one would
expect similar failures in other systems too.
28All distributions that are absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure.
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The condition of approximate f -independence is violated whenever a system with a
continuous dynamics is observed in intervals that are so short that no independence
is achieved, not even approximately. The issue is that if a system is continuous, the
spreading out of regions in phase space happens continuously and hence indepen-
dence can be achieved only after a sufficiently long time period has passed. This is
not just a theoretical possibility. In fact, relaxation times can be observed experi-
mentally, which involves observing the system in intervals that are shorter than the
time needed for them to randomize. In such a situation Gibbsian probabilities will
not be correct.
There is a legitimate question how much weight these examples bear. Due to the
mathematical complexities of the systems usually studied in GSM, explicit results are
available only for simple systems like the Kac ring and the mushroom gas. Whether,
and under what circumstance, masking and approximate f -independence hold in
more realistic systems is an interesting question that deserves further attention. And
the question is not merely one of doing ‘routine background checks’ that one confi-
dently expects to return the right verdict. As we noted above, both conditions are
highly non-trivial and we should expect them to fail in some systems. Indeed, in
some systems both conditions fail. This happens, for instance, in the KAC ring when
periods of time are considered that are shorter than the relaxation time (and we
associate the system’s thermodynamic equilibrium values with the values of f that
the system assumes most of the time). Surprisingly, GSM and AP still work in this
particular case even though probabilism (in any of its forms) fails, and hence offers
no justification for AP. This suggests that probabilism does not provide a satisfactory
general interpretation of GSM.29
8 Conclusion
We reviewed different interpretations of GSM and came to the conclusion that among
the currently available interpretations qualified probabilism and fluctuation probabil-
ism are the most promising options. However, in their original formulation they were
based on ρ-universalism, which is false. The measure ρ gives correct probabilities
for events to occur at all times only if the system under study satisfies the masking
condition or the f -independence condition. So probabilism (of either variety) is true
only if at least one of these conditions holds.
If this is the case, GSM allows us to calculate the probability of fluctuations. But, as
29For our explanation of why AP works in these cases see our ([unpublished])
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we have seen above, this does not ipso facto imply that fluctuations turn out to be
thermodynamic. The account can give the right fluctuations probabilities, but the
fluctuations can be of the wrong kind, for instance in that large fluctuations can turn
out to be more likely than small fluctuations. This is not merely a remote conceptual
possibility. As noted in Section 6, there are systems in which fluctuations are not
thermodynamic and in which AP fails.
Finally, it is crucial to note that not all justifications of AP have to be given in the
framework of the fluctuation approach. There is a temptation to regard the fluctua-
tion approach as the ‘natural’ interpretation of GSM, and then discuss the validity of
AP only within the fluctuation approach (where the question comes down to whether
fluctuations are thermodynamic). This temptation must be resisted. There are cases
where AP holds and the fluctuation approach fails, and narrowing our focus on the
fluctuation account makes us blind for such cases. The Kac ring with the standard
magnetisation macro variable is a case in point. As we have seen above, the Kac ring
satisfies neither the masking condition (for short time periods) nor f -independence
and yet it turns out that 〈f〉 is equal to the equilibrium value. Intuitively this is the
case because even though the various regions where f takes values deviating consid-
erably from the equilibrium value are distributed symmetrically over the state space
and hence ‘cancel out’ when the average is calculated. Hence, if we are interested
in justifying AP, we must sometimes look beyond fluctuations, and indeed beyond
probabilism.
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